Corrections required:

Lemma 6, pg. 253

Incorrect Text:

Lemma 6. *The Indigenous people's best-response resistance function is:*

(i). acceptance Case 1 and rejection,

$$R(\lambda) = \left(\frac{D}{c_I} \times \lambda\right)^{\frac{1}{2}}$$

(ii). acceptance Case 2,

$$\widetilde{R}(\lambda) = \frac{D\sqrt{3\lambda^3}}{\beta\sqrt{B\theta + \lambda(D\lambda - \theta Q)}}$$

Corrected Text:

LEMMA 6. *The Indigenous people's best-response resistance function is:*

$$R(\lambda) = \left(\frac{D}{c_I} \times \lambda\right)^{\frac{1}{2}}.$$

Lemma 6 Discussion, pg. 253

Incorrect Text:

As before, the Indigenous people's best-response resistance (for rejection and acceptance Case 1) is increasing in the initial violence they endure and decreasing in their cost of resisting. In Case 2, their best-response resistance is increasing in settler violence depending upon the range of initial violence and existing level of environmental damage.

Corrected Text:

As before, the Indigenous people's best-response resistance is increasing in the initial violence they endure and environmental damage but is decreasing in their cost of resisting.

Proposition 2, pg. 253

Incorrect Text:

Proposition 2. *The equilibrium actions taken by the settler colonizer and Indigenous people group are*:

(i) under acceptance Case 1

$$\lambda^*_{A1} = \left[\frac{c_I D([1-\theta]B + \gamma\theta V)}{\gamma X}\right]^{\frac{1}{2}}, \quad R^*_{A1} = \left[\frac{D^3([1-\theta]B + \gamma\theta V)}{c_I \gamma X}\right]^{\frac{1}{4}}$$

and

$$M^*_{A1} = \left[\frac{B^2 X}{c_I \gamma D([1-\theta]B + \gamma\theta V)}\right]^{\frac{1}{2}} - \frac{Q}{\gamma}$$

(ii) under acceptance Case 2,

$$\lambda^*_{A2} = \underset{\lambda}{argmax}\{\frac{1}{\beta}\left[\frac{3\theta c_s(BD\lambda + B\theta Q - \theta\lambda Q^2)}{B\theta + \lambda(D\lambda - \theta Q)} - \frac{\lambda c_s(\beta + 3D^2)}{D} - \theta(\beta L + 3Qc_s)\right] - T - V\left[1 - \frac{\theta}{\lambda}\right]\}$$

$$R^*_{A2} = \frac{\sqrt{3}D\lambda^{*3/2}_{A2}}{\beta\sqrt{B\theta + \lambda^*_{A2}(D\lambda^*_{A2} - \theta Q)}}, \quad and\ M^*_{A2} = 0$$

(iii) under rejection

$$\lambda^*_R = \left[\frac{VDc_I}{X}\right]^{\frac{1}{2}}, \quad R^*_R = \left[\frac{VD^3}{c_I X}\right]^{\frac{1}{4}}, \quad and\ M^*_R = 0$$

Corrected Text:

PROPOSITION 2. *The equilibrium actions taken by the settler colonizer and Indigenous people group are:*

(i) under acceptance Case 1

$$\lambda^*_{A1} = \left[\frac{c_I D([1-\theta]B + \gamma\theta V)}{\gamma X}\right]^{\frac{1}{2}}, \ R^*_{A1} = \left[\frac{D^3([1-\theta]B + \gamma\theta V)}{c_I \gamma X}\right]^{\frac{1}{4}}, \ and$$

$$M^*_{A1} = \left[\frac{B^2 X}{c_I \gamma D([1-\theta]B + \gamma\theta V)}\right]^{\frac{1}{2}} - \frac{Q}{\gamma}$$

(ii) under acceptance Case 2

$$\lambda^*_{A2} = \left[\frac{\theta V D c_I}{X}\right]^{\frac{1}{2}}, \ R^*_{A2} = \left[\frac{\theta V D^3}{c_I X}\right]^{\frac{1}{4}}, \ and \ M^*_{A2} = 0.$$

(iii) under rejection

$$\lambda^*_{R} = \left[\frac{V D c_I}{X}\right]^{\frac{1}{2}}, \ R^*_{R} = \left[\frac{V D^3}{c_I X}\right]^{\frac{1}{4}}, \ M^*_{R} = 0.$$

Figure 2, pg. 254

Corrective Action: Remove Figure 2. It is now unnecessary.

Proposition 2 Discussion, pg. 254

Incorrect Text:

Figure 2 illustrates how initial violence and Indigenous resistance in acceptance Cases 1 and 2 change as the probability that all-out conflict occurs despite acceptance increases.[28] Acceptance Case 1 (Figure 2(a)) violence and resistance are decreasing in the likelihood that agreement does not prevent all-out conflict. In Case 2 (Figure 2(b)), however, the more likely it is that acceptance fails to prevent all-out conflict, the settler is more initially violent, and in response the Indigenous people resists more. A primary difference between acceptance in Cases 1 and 2 is that the settler must pay compensation (if the agreement is maintained and all-out conflict is avoided) in the former whereas the settler does not pay compensation in the latter. It is only in Case 1 that an increase in the likelihood that all-out conflict occurs after agreement makes it less likely that the settler will have to compensate the Indigenous people. Recall that compensation in Case 1 is strictly decreasing in settler violence; therefore, as it becomes more likely that the settler will not need to provide any compensation (as θ increases), the strategic value of initial violence diminishes. This is likely the driver for the negative relationship between violence and the probability of unplanned all-out conflict in Case 1.

Corrected Text:

Acceptance Case 1 violence and resistance are increasing in the likelihood that agreement does not prevent all-out conflict if and only if $V \geq \frac{B}{\gamma}$. In Case 2, however, the more likely it is that acceptance fails to prevent all-out conflict, the settler is more initially violent, and in response the Indigenous people resists more.

Proof of Lemma 6, Case 2, pg. 267

Incorrect Text:

Case 2

If $\lambda \geqslant \frac{B}{Q}$, and acceptance is induced ($M = 0$), it implies that the Indigenous people faces the scenario

$$\max_R \left[\frac{B\theta}{\lambda} - \frac{c_I R}{\beta} - \frac{D\lambda}{\beta R} - \theta Q\right] \tag{83}$$

The first-order condition with respect to R is

$$\frac{\partial \pi_I^{accept}}{\partial R} = \frac{\beta^2 B\theta R^2 + \lambda\left(D\lambda\left(\beta^2 R^2 - 3D\lambda\right) - \beta^2\theta Q R^2\right)}{\beta^3 \lambda R^4} = 0 \tag{84}$$

solving for R, we find

$$R(\lambda) = \frac{\sqrt{3} D\lambda^{3/2}}{\sqrt{\beta^2 B\theta + \beta^2 D\lambda^2 - \beta^2\theta\lambda Q}} \tag{85}$$

Corrected Text:

Case 2

If $\lambda \geq \frac{B}{Q}$, and acceptance is induced ($M = 0$), it implies that the Indigenous people faces this scenario:

$$\max_R \left[\frac{B\theta}{\lambda} - \frac{c_I R}{\beta} - \frac{D\lambda}{\beta R} - \theta Q\right]$$

The first-order condition with respect to R is

$$\frac{\partial \pi_I^{accept}}{\partial R} = \frac{D\lambda}{\beta R^2} - \frac{c_I}{\beta} = 0,$$

solving for R, we find

$$R(\lambda) = \sqrt{\frac{D\lambda}{c_I}}.$$

Proof of Proposition 2, Case 2, pg. 268-269

Incorrect Text:

Consider that they offer no compensation in acceptance Case 2, however, so we substitute the corresponding best-response resistance function from the Proof of Lemma 6 into the maximization. Therefore, the maximization can be written as

$$\max_{\lambda}\left[\frac{\frac{3\theta c_S\left(BD\lambda + B\theta Q - \theta\lambda Q^2\right)}{B\theta + \lambda(D\lambda - \theta Q)} - \frac{\lambda c_S\left(\beta + 3D^2\right)}{D}}{\beta} - \frac{\theta(\beta L + 3Qc_S)}{\beta} + T - \frac{\theta V}{\lambda} + V\right] \quad (93)$$

$$\frac{\partial(\cdot)}{\partial\lambda} = \frac{\theta V}{\lambda^2} - \frac{c_S(\beta B^2\theta^2 + B\theta\lambda(9D^3\lambda + 2\beta D\lambda - 2\beta\theta Q)}{\beta D(B\theta + \lambda(D\lambda - \theta Q))^2} - \frac{\lambda^2(D^2\lambda^2(\beta + 3D^2) - 2D\theta\lambda Q(\beta + 3D^2) + \beta\theta^2 Q^2))}{\beta D(B\theta + \lambda(D\lambda - \theta Q))^2} = 0 \quad (94$$

Figure 2 illustrates the change in settler violence and Indigenous resistance wit respect to the probability that agreement fails to prevent all-out conflict (assumin $B = 100$, $Q = 90$, $D = 10$, $\beta = 1$, $V = 40$, $c_s = \frac{1}{2}$, $\gamma = \frac{1}{2}$, and $c_I = \frac{1}{2}$).

Corrected Text:

Consider that they offer no compensation in acceptance Case 2, however, so we substitute the corresponding best-response resistance function from the Proof of Lemma 6 into the maximization. Therefore, the maximization can be written:

$$\max_{\lambda}\left[V - \frac{\beta D\lambda c_S}{c_I} - \frac{\lambda c_S}{D} - \theta L - T - \frac{\theta V}{\lambda}\right].$$

where the first-order condition with respect to λ is

$$\frac{\partial(\cdot)}{\partial\lambda} = \frac{\theta V}{\lambda^2} - \frac{\beta D c_S}{c_I} - \frac{c_S}{D} = 0$$

Solving for λ, we obtain

$$\lambda^*_{A2} = \left[\frac{\theta V D c_I}{X}\right]^{\frac{1}{2}}.$$

Now we substitute this result into the Indigenous people's best-response function and obtain

$$R^*_{A2} = \left[\frac{\theta V D^3}{c_I X}\right]^{\frac{1}{4}}.$$