Advanced Microeconomic Theory

Chapter 6: Partial and General Equilibrium

Outline

- Partial Equilibrium Analysis
- General Equilibrium Analysis
- Comparative Statics
- Welfare Analysis

- In a competitive equilibrium (CE), all agents must select an optimal allocation given their resources:
 - Firms choose profit-maximizing production plans given their technology;
 - Consumers choose utility-maximizing bundles given their budget constraint.
- A competitive equilibrium allocation will emerge at a price that makes consumers' purchasing plans to coincide with the firms' production decision.

• Firm:

– Given the price vector p^* , firm j's equilibrium output level q_i^* must solve

$$\max_{q_j \ge 0} p^* q_j - c_j(q_j)$$

which yields the necessary and sufficient condition

$$p^* \le c_j'(q_j^*)$$
, with equality if $q_j^* > 0$

– That is, every firm j produces until the point in which its marginal cost, $c'_j(q^*_j)$, coincides with the current market price.

Consumers:

Consider a quasilinear utility function

$$u_i(m_i, x_i) = m_i + \phi_i(x_i)$$

where m_i denotes the numeraire, and $\phi'_i(x_i) > 0$, $\phi''_i(x_i) < 0$ for all $x_i > 0$.

– Normalizing, $\phi_i(0) = 0$. Recall that with quasilinear utility functions, the wealth effects for all non-numeraire commodities are zero.

- Consumer i's UMP is

$$\max_{m_i \in \mathbb{R}_+, x_i \in \mathbb{R}_+} m_i + \phi_i(x_i)$$

s.t.
$$\underline{m_i + p^* x_i} \le w_{m_i} + \sum_{j=1}^J \theta_{ij} (\underline{p^* q_j^* - c_j(q_j^*)})$$
Total resources (endowment+profits)

 The budget constraint must hold with equality (by Walras' law). Hence,

$$m_i = -p^* x_i + \left[w_{m_i} + \sum_{j=1}^J \theta_{ij} (p^* q_j^* - c_j(q_j^*)) \right]$$

Substituting the budget constraint into the objective function,

$$\max_{x_{i} \in \mathbb{R}_{+}} \phi_{i}(x_{i}) - p^{*}x_{i} + \left[w_{m_{i}} + \sum_{j=1}^{J} \theta_{ij} (p^{*}q_{j}^{*} - c_{j}(q_{j}^{*})) \right]$$

– FOCs wrt x_i yields

$$\phi_i'(x_i^*) \leq p^*$$
, with equality if $x_i^* > 0$


– That is, consumer increases the amount he buys of good x until the point in which the marginal utility he obtains exactly coincides with the market price he has to pay for it.

– Hence, an allocation $(x_1^*, x_2^*, ..., x_I^*, q_1^*, q_2^*, ..., q_J^*)$ and a price vector $p^* \in \mathbb{R}^L$ constitute a CE if:


$$p^* \le c_j'(q_j^*)$$
, with equality if $q_j^* > 0$
 $\phi_i'(x_i^*) \le p^*$, with equality if $x_i^* > 0$
 $\sum_{i=1}^{I} x_i^* = \sum_{j=1}^{J} q_j^*$

 Note that the these conditions do not depend upon the consumer's initial endowment.


• The individual demand curve, where $\phi_i'(x_i^*) \leq p^*$




 Horizontally summing individual demand curves yields the aggregate demand curve.



• The individual supply curve, where $p^* \le c_i'(q_i^*)$




 Horizontally summing individual supply curves yields the aggregate supply curve.



- Superimposing aggregate demand and aggregate supply curves, we obtain the CE allocation of good \$\chi\$.
- To guarantee that a CE exists, the equilibrium price p* must satisfy

$$\max_{i} \phi'_{i}(0) \ge p^{*}$$

$$\ge \min_{j} c'_{j}(0)$$




- Also, since $\phi'_i(x_i)$ is downward sloping in x_i , and $c'_j(q_i)$ is upward sloping in q_i , then aggregate demand and supply cross at a unique point.
 - Hence, the CE allocation is unique.

If we have

$$\max_i \, \phi_i'(0) < \min_j \, c_j'(0),$$

then there is *no* positive production or consumption of good x.



• **Example 6.1**:

- Assume a perfectly competitive industry consisting of two types of firms: 100 firms of type
 A and 30 firms of type B.
- Short-run supply curve of type A firm is $s_A(p) = 2p$
- Short-run supply curve of type B firm is $s_B(p) = 10p$
- The Walrasian market demand curve is x(p) = 5000 500p

- Example 6.1 (continued):
 - Summing the individual supply curves of the 100 type-A firms and the 30 type-B firms,

$$S(p) = 100 \cdot 2p + 30 \cdot 10p = 500p$$

 The short-run equilibrium occurs at the price at which quantity demanded equals quantity supplied,

$$5000 - 500p = 500p$$
, or $p = 5$

- Each type-A firm supplies: $s_A(p) = 2 \cdot 5 = 10$
- Each type-B firm supplies: $s_B(p) = 10 \cdot 5 = 50$

- Let us assume that the consumer's preferences are affected by a vector of parameters $\alpha \in \mathbb{R}^M$, where $M \leq L$.
 - Then, consumer i's utility from good x is $\phi_i(x_i, \alpha)$.
- Similarly, firms' technology is affected by a vector of parameters $\beta \in \mathbb{R}^S$, where $S \leq L$.
 - Then, firm j's cost function is $c_j(q_j, \beta)$.

Notation:

- $-\hat{p}_i(p,t)$ is the effective price paid by the consumer
- $-\hat{p}_i(p,t)$ is the effective price received by the firm
- Per unit tax: $\hat{p}_i(p, t) = p + t$.
 - Example: t = \$2, regardless of the price p
- Ad valorem tax (sales tax): $\hat{p}_i(p,t) = p + pt = p(1+t)$
 - Example: t = 0.1 (10%).

 If consumption and production are strictly positive in the CE, then

$$\phi_i'(x_i^*, \alpha) = \hat{p}_i(p^*, t)$$
 for every consumer i
 $c_j'(q_j^*, \beta) = \hat{p}_j(p^*, t)$ for every firm j

$$\sum_{i=1}^{I} x_i^* = \sum_{j=1}^{J} q_j^*$$

- Then we have I+J+1 equations, which depend on parameter values α , β and t.
- In order to understand how x_i^* or q_j^* depends on parameters α and β , we can use the *Implicit Function Theorem*.
 - The above functions have to be differentiable.

• Implicit Function Theorem:

- Let u(x, y) be a utility function, where x and y are amounts of two goods.
- If $\frac{\partial u(\bar{x},\bar{y})}{\partial x} \neq 0$ when evaluated at (\bar{x},\bar{y}) , then

$$\frac{\partial u(\bar{x},\bar{y})}{\partial x}dx + \frac{\partial u(\bar{x},\bar{y})}{\partial y}dy = 0$$

which yields

$$\frac{dy(\bar{x})}{dx} = -\frac{\frac{\partial u(x,y)}{\partial x}}{\frac{\partial u(\bar{x},\bar{y})}{\partial y}}$$

– Similarly, if $\frac{\partial u(\bar{x},\bar{y})}{\partial y}\neq 0$ when evaluated at (\bar{x},\bar{y}) , then

$$\frac{dx(\bar{y})}{dy} = -\frac{\frac{\partial u(x,y)}{\partial y}}{\frac{\partial u(\bar{x},\bar{y})}{\partial x}}$$

for all (\bar{x}, \bar{y}) .

– Similarly, if $u(x,\alpha)$ describes the consumption of a single good x, where α determines the consumer's preference for x, and $\frac{\partial u(x,\alpha)}{\partial \alpha} \neq 0$, then

$$\frac{dx(\alpha)}{d\alpha} = -\frac{\frac{\partial u(x,\alpha)}{\partial \alpha}}{\frac{\partial u(x,\alpha)}{\partial x}}$$

- The left-hand side is unknown
- The right-hand side is, however, easier to find.

- Sales tax (Example 6.2):
 - The expression of the aggregate demand is now x(p+t), because the effective price that the consumer pays is actually p+t.
 - In equilibrium, the market price after imposing the $\tan p^*(t)$, must hence satisfy

$$x(p^*(t) + t) = q(p^*(t))$$

– if the sales tax is marginally increased, and functions are differentiable at $p = p^*(t)$, $x'(p^*(t) + t) \cdot (p^{*'}(t) + 1) = q'(p^*(t)) \cdot p^{*'}(t)$

Rearranging, we obtain

$$p^{*'}(t) \cdot [x'(p^{*}(t) + t) - q'(p^{*}(t))]$$

= $-x'(p^{*}(t) + t)$

Hence,

$$p^{*'}(t) = -\frac{x'(p^*(t)+t)}{x'(p^*(t)+t)-q'(p^*(t))}$$

- Since x(p) is decreasing in prices, $x'(p^*(t) + t) < 0$, and q(p) is increasing in prices, $q'(p^*(t)) > 0$,

$$p^{*'}(t) = -\underbrace{\frac{x'(p^{*}(t)+t)}{x'(p^{*}(t)+t)} - \underbrace{q'(p^{*}(t))}_{+}}_{=} = -\frac{-}{-} = -$$


- Hence, $p^{*'}(t) < 0$.
- Moreover, $p^{*'}(t)$ ∈ (-1,0].
- Therefore, $p^*(t)$ decreases in t.
 - That is, the price received by producers falls in the tax, but less than proportionally.
- Additionally, since $p^*(t) + t$ is the price paid by consumers, then $p^{*'}(t) + 1$ is the marginal increase in the price paid by consumers when the tax marginally increases.
 - Since $p^{*'}(t) \ge 1$, then $p^{*'}(t) + 1 \ge 0$, and consumers' cost of the product also raises less than proportionally.

No tax:

- CE occurs at $p^*(0)$ and $x^*(0)$

• *Tax:*

- $-x^*$ decreases from $x^*(0)$ to $x^*(t)$
- Consumers now pay $p^*(t) + t$
- Producers now receive $p^*(t)$ for the $x^*(t)$ units they sell.



- Sales Tax (Extreme Cases):
 - a) The supply is very responsive to price changes, i.e., $q'(p^*(t))$ is large.


$$p^{*'}(t) = -\frac{x'(p^*(t)+t)}{x'(p^*(t)+t)-q'(p^*(t))} \to 0$$

- Therefore, $p^{*'}(t) \rightarrow 0$, and the price received by producers does not fall.
- However, consumers still have to pay $p^*(t) + t$.
 - A marginal increase in taxes therefore provides an increase in the consumer's price of

$$p^{*'}(t) + 1 = 0 + 1 = 1$$

The tax is solely borne by consumers.

- A very elastic supply curve
 - The price received by producers almost does not fall.
 - But, the price paid by consumers increases by exactly the amount of the tax.



b) The supply is not responsive to price changes, i.e., $q'(p^*(t))$ is close to zero.


$$p^{*\prime}(t) = -\frac{x'(p^{*}(t)+t)}{x'(p^{*}(t)+t)-q'(p^{*}(t))} = -1$$

- Therefore, $p^{*'}(t) = -1$, and the price received by producers falls by \$1 for every extra dollar in taxes.
 - Producers bear most of the tax burden
- In contrast, consumers pay $p^*(t) + t$
 - A marginal increase in taxes produces an increase in the consumer's price of

$$p^{*\prime}(t) + 1 = -1 + 1 = 0$$

Consumers do not bear tax burden at all.

Inelastic supply curve



• **Example 6.3**:

- Consider a competitive market in which the government will be imposing an ad valorem tax of t.
- Aggregate demand curve is $x(p) = Ap^{\varepsilon}$, where A > 0 and $\varepsilon < 0$, and aggregate supply curve is $q(p) = ap^{\gamma}$, where a > 0 and $\gamma > 0$.
- Let us evaluate how the equilibrium price is affected by a marginal increase in the tax.

- Example 6.3 (continued):
 - The change in the price received by producers at t=0 is

$$p^{*'}(0) = -\frac{x'(p^{*})}{x'(p^{*}) - q'(p^{*})}$$

$$= -\frac{A\varepsilon p^{*\varepsilon - 1}}{A\varepsilon p^{*\varepsilon - 1} - a\gamma p^{*\gamma - 1}} = -\frac{A\varepsilon p^{*\varepsilon}}{A\varepsilon p^{*\varepsilon} - a\gamma p^{*\gamma}}$$

$$= -\frac{\varepsilon x(p^{*})}{\varepsilon x(p^{*}) - \gamma q(p^{*})} = -\frac{\varepsilon}{\varepsilon - \gamma}$$

– The change in the price paid by consumers at t=0 is

$$p^{*'}(0) + 1 = -\frac{\varepsilon}{\varepsilon - \gamma} + 1 = -\frac{\gamma}{\varepsilon - \gamma}$$

- Example 6.3 (continued):
 - When $\gamma = 0$ (i.e., supply is perfectly inelastic), the price paid by consumers in unchanged, and the price received by producers decreases be the amount of the tax.
 - That is, producers bear the full effect of the tax.
 - When $\varepsilon = 0$ (i.e., demand is perfectly inelastic), the price received by producers is unchanged and the price paid by consumers increases by the amount of the tax.
 - That is, consumers bear the full burden of the tax.

- Example 6.3 (continued):
 - When $\varepsilon \to -\infty$ (i.e., demand is perfectly elastic), the price paid by consumers is unchanged, and the price received by producers decreases by the amount of the tax.
 - When $\gamma \to +\infty$ (i.e., supply is perfectly elastic), the price received by producers is unchanged and the price paid by consumers increases by the amount of the tax.

- Let us now measure the changes in the aggregate social welfare due to a change in the competitive equilibrium allocation.
- Consider the aggregate surplus

$$S = \sum_{i=1}^{I} \phi_i(x_i) - \sum_{j=1}^{J} c_j(q_j)$$

- Take a differential change in the quantity of good k that individuals consume and that firms produce such that $\sum_{i=1}^{I} dx_i = \sum_{j=1}^{J} dq_j$.
- The change in the aggregate surplus is

$$dS = \sum_{i=1}^{I} \phi'_{i}(x_{i}) dx_{i} - \sum_{j=1}^{J} c'_{j}(q_{j}) dq_{j}$$

Since

- $-\phi'_i(x_i) = P(x)$ for all consumers; and
 - That is, every individual consumes until MB=p.
- $-c'_{j}(q_{j}) = C'(q)$ for all firms
 - That is, every firm's MC coincides with aggregate MC)

then the change in surplus can be rewritten as

$$dS = \sum_{i=1}^{I} P(x) dx_i - \sum_{j=1}^{J} C'(q) dq_j$$


= $P(x) \sum_{i=1}^{I} dx_i - C'(q) \sum_{j=1}^{J} dq_j$

• But since $\sum_{i=1}^{I} dx_i = \sum_{j=1}^{J} dq_j = dx$, and x = q by market feasibility, then dS = [P(x) - C'(q)]dx

• Intuition:

 The change in surplus of a marginal increase in consumption (and production) reflects the difference between the consumers' additional utility and firms' additional cost of production.

Differential change in surplus




 We can also integrate the above expression, eliminating the differentials, in order to obtain the total surplus for an aggregate consumption level of x:

$$S(x) = S_0 + \int_0^x [P(s) - C'(s)] ds$$

where $S_0 = S(0)$ is the constant of integration, and represents the aggregate surplus when aggregate consumption is zero, x = 0.

 $-S_0 = 0$ if the intercept of the marginal cost function satisfies $c'_i(0) = 0$ for all J firms.

Surplus at aggregate consumption x



- For which consumption level is aggregate surplus S(x) maximized?
 - Differentiating S(x) with respect to x,

$$S'(x) = P(x^*) - C'(x^*) \le 0$$

or, $P(x^*) \le C'(x^*)$

The second order (sufficient) condition is

$$S''(x) = \underbrace{P'(x^*)}_{-} - \underbrace{C''(x^*)}_{+} < 0$$

- Hence, $S(x^*)$ is concave.
- Then, when $x^* > 0$, aggregate surplus S(x) is maximized at $P(x^*) = C'(x^*)$.

- Therefore, the CE allocation maximizes aggregate surplus.
- This is the First Welfare Theorem:
 - Every CE is Pareto optimal (PO).

• Example 6.4:

- Consider an aggregate demand x(p) = a bq and aggregate supply $y(p) = J \cdot \frac{p}{2}$, where J is the number of firms in the industry.
- The CE price solves

$$a - bp = J \cdot \frac{p}{2}$$
 or $p = \frac{2a}{2b+J}$

 Intuitively, as demand increases (number of firms) increases (decreases) the equilibrium price increases (decreases, respectively).

- Example 6.4 (continued):
 - Therefore, equilibrium output is

$$x^* = a - b \frac{2a}{2b + J} = \frac{aJ}{2b + J}$$

Surplus is

$$S(x^*) = \int_0^{x^*} p(x) - C'(x) dx$$

where
$$p(x) = \frac{a-x}{b}$$
 and $C'(x) = \frac{2x}{I}$.

Thus,

$$S(x^*) = \int_0^{x^*} \left(\frac{a - x}{b} - \frac{2x}{J} \right) dx = \frac{a^2 J}{4b^2 + 2bJ}$$

which is increasing in the number of firms *J*.